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INTRODUCTION
1

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits
2
3
public entities from discriminating against disabled persons. Every
state in the Union has a disabled parking program, but most states
charge the disabled to recover the costs of implementing and
4
maintaining these programs. A small percentage of states actually
∗
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42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq. (2003).
2
Public entities include the states and a number of state and local organizations.
42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2003).
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12131 (2003). “No qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003).
4
Thirty-one states charge for parking placards, disabled designated license
plates, or both disabled placards and license plates (no states require both placards
and special license plates to participate in their disabled parking programs). See ALA.
CODE § 32-6-131 (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-2409 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
42-3-121 (2)(a)(III)(d) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-253(a) (2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2135(c) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.0848 (West 2001); GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-2-74 (2001); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-616 (2001); IND. CODE § 9-145-8 (2001) (assessing a fee for temporary placards only); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1,125
(2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463:4 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2
(2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.675 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 169.345 (2002); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 301.142 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 482.384 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
261:88 (2001) (assessing a fee for special license plates, but not for placards); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-206 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-16 (Michie 2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-37.6 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-15 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4503.44 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 112 (West 2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-3-1960 (Law. Co-op. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-21-103 (2001); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 681.003 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §41-1a-408 (2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1241 (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT. § 343.51 (2001). Nineteen
states do not charge a fee for disabled parking placards, and charge no fee beyond
normal licensing fees for disabled designated license plates. See ALASKA STAT. §
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charge the disabled much more than the costs of the programs,
effectively using the program as an additional source of state
5
revenue. The policy issue in this debate is not over whether the
states should enact disabled parking programs, but over who should
be required to pay for them. Thus, while all fifty states enforce
disabled parking programs that seem to comply with Title II’s antidiscrimination mandate, most states do not comply with another
provision of the ADA promulgated by the Department of Justice
6
7
(“DOJ”). 28 C.F.R. section 35.130(f) (the “Regulation”) prohibits
states from charging the disabled fees to recover the costs of Title II
8
programs. State non-compliance with the Regulation has sparked a
substantial amount of litigation over whether Title II validly prohibits
the states and state officials from charging disabled individuals to
participate in Title II programs.
9
A recent Supreme Court decision complicates this issue. In
10
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held
11
that Title I of the ADA could not sustain a suit for damages against
28.10.181 (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-15-308 (Michie 2001); CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 5007 (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-52 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 49-410 (Michie
2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 31L.2 (West 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.042 (BanksBaldwin 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 521 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSP. II § 13-616 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-19-56 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN.§
49-4-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1738 (2001); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 404-a
(McKinney 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 811.602 (2001); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1388
(West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-28-7 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-5-76.1 (Michie
2001); 23 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 304(a) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.16.381
(2001); W. VA. CODE § 17C-13-6 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-213 (Michie 2001).
5
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.0848 (West 2001) (charging $15 for four-year
permits and $22.50 for six-year permits); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2 (2001)
(charging a $25 fee for placards); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-21-103 (2001) (charging a
$20.50 initial fee and $3 renewal fee every two years which was noted by the Sixth
Circuit in, Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 614 (2000), as over 1000% of the raw
cost of disabled placards and license plates).
6
42 U.S.C. section 12134 (2002) requires the Attorney General to develop
regulations designed to implement Title II.
7
DOJ Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Governments, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2003) is hereinafter referred to as the
“Regulation.”
8
The states are prohibited from placing,
a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of
individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of such measures, such as
the provision of auxiliary aids or program accessibility, that are
required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2001).
9
See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
10
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
11
Title I prohibits discrimination against the disabled by employers. 42 U.S.C. §
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the states as an exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
12
enforcement power. While the Court seemed to limit its holding to
13
14
Title I of the ADA, lower courts have extended Garrett’s to Title II.
This unsettled state of the law creates a number of ongoing issues,
including: (1) must the states comply with Title II; (2) does
compliance include adherence to the prohibition on charging the
disabled for the costs of Title II programs; (3) if compliance is
required, can individuals sue for damages or injunctive relief; (4) if
individuals cannot sue the states to enforce Title II, are the states free
to ignore the Act; and (5) will the ADA, the most substantial civil
rights legislation of the 1990’s, survive upcoming judicial scrutiny?
While the Circuits are split on the issue of whether Title II is
enforceable as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power, Garrett
15
indicates that the Court will likely hold that it is not. If Title II is
unsupported by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unenforceable
16
unless supported by another congressional power. Part I of this

12112 (a) (2003).
12
531 U.S. at 368. The fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to enact legislation that enforces the other provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 18.
13
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
14
See Ass’n For Disabled Americans v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D.
Fla. 2001). Discussing the extension of Garrett to Title II, the Southern District Court
of Florida stated the following:
The Court did explicitly limit its holding in Garrett to Title I of the
ADA, and specifically declined to decide whether Eleventh
Amendment immunity bars claims against a state under Title II of the
ADA. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1. Despite the Court’s purportedly
limited ruling, however, the analytical framework set forth in Garrett
has led several lower courts to conclude that suits by individuals against
states under Title II are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 1293 (citing two circuit courts and seven district courts that have extended
Garrett, finding Title II could not be enforced through private damage actions, and
one circuit and five district courts that have allowed post-Garrett private damage
actions seeking Title II enforcement to proceed against the states).
15
Id.
16
If not within congressional power, any act of Congress is void.
Early in this Nation’s history, this Court established the sound
proposition that constitutional government in a system of separated
powers requires judges to regard as inoperative any legislative act, even
of Congress itself, that is “repugnant to the Constitution . . . .”
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (finding that Miranda
announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not legislatively revoke) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 148 (1803)).
It has been the policy of the American states . . . and of the people of
the United States . . . to define with precision the objects of the
legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled
boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state,
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Comment explores Garrett and its impact on the current circuit split
within the Title II subset of disabled parking cases.
17
Congress invoked two of its powers when it enacted Title II: the
18
19
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause Power.
Although the Commerce Clause power does not abrogate state
20
immunity, if Title II is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause
power, individuals should be able to prevent states from charging
21
them to recover costs of Title II programs through Ex Parte Young
suits for injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young allows an individual to sue a
22
state official for injunctive relief when that official acts in violation
23
of a federal law. Under Ex Parte Young a state official acting in
violation of federal law is acting illegally and cannot claim the state’s
immunity from suit because a state’s power is insufficient to
24
immunize state official activity that violates federal law. The illegal
acts of the state officer strip the officer of state authority making the
25
suit one against him personally rather than one against the state. Ex
26
Parte Young is often referred to as a fiction because even though the

violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 168 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting)).
17
While the Constitution gives Congress many powers, not all of these powers
can be used to support legislation. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 168 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
18
“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
19
“Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. “It
is the purpose of this act . . . to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2002).
20
The only congressional power that, if properly utilized by Congress, enables a
private citizen to sue a state directly for money damages without that state’s consent
is Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaidpostsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (finding Florida
could not be sued under the Lanham Act because such suit was unsupported by
either state consent or valid Fourteenth Amendment waiver of sovereign immunity).
21
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
22
An individual cannot recover money damages from a state official through an
Ex Parte Young suit. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (upholding a lower
court’s order for prospective injunctive relief but reversing the lower court’s award of
money damages where plaintiff sued under Ex Parte Young theory).
23
Id.
24
209 U.S. at 160.
25
Id.
26
See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Indian Tribe, 521 U.S. 561, 570 (1997) (discussing
Ex Parte Young as an “obvious fiction”).
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suit is nominally against the state official, the suit is seeking relief
27
from state action and is therefore really a suit against the state. If
the Regulation is a valid federal law because it is within Congress’s
Commerce Clause power to enact, then the regulation is indirectly
enforceable against the states.
Part II considers the validity of Title II under Congress’s
Commerce Power, an issue that remains unlitigated in the circuit
28
courts. This Part demonstrates that the Commerce Clause provides
ample support for the Regulation. Therefore, individual plaintiffs
should be able to sue state officials and enforce the Regulation
through Ex Parte Young actions. Even if Title II is a valid exercise of
the Commerce Power, Title II may still be unenforceable if it violates
29
the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
30
from forcing the states or state officers to act. Part III will explore
this issue. This analysis indicates that Congress may not be able to
force the states to enact disabled parking programs but can regulate
such programs if they are voluntarily enacted by the states.
Even if Title II is a valid exercise of Commerce Power and the
Tenth Amendment does not prevent Congress from regulating state
disabled parking programs, another inquiry is necessary to determine
whether the Regulation is enforceable because it was not enacted by
Congress, but by the DOJ. Part IV will demonstrate, using the
current Chevron test for analyzing whether an agency’s exercise of
congressionally granted power is valid, that the regulation is indeed
enforceable.
A further inquiry is necessary to answer the question of where
plaintiffs can bring enforcement actions because the Tax Injunction
31
Act of 1937 (“TIA”) may bar plaintiffs from bringing these actions in
federal court. Part V will focus on a second circuit split over whether
27

Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman
endorses this view of Ex Parte Young. 465 U.S. 89, 144 n.25 (1984).
28
Courts noting but not deciding this issue include the Tenth Circuit in
Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1025 (2001); the Second Circuit in Garcia v.
State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 108 (2001); the Eighth Circuit in
Randolph v. Rogers, 253 F.3d 342, 348 n.12 (2001); the Seventh Circuit in Walker v.
Snyder, 215 F.3d 344, 346 (2000) (assuming, without deciding, that the ADA is a valid
exercise of Commerce Clause power); Bowers v. NCAA, 1717 F. Supp. 2d 389, 407
(D.N.J. 2001) (assuming without deciding that the ADA is a valid exercise of
Commerce Clause power).
29
The Tenth Amendment explicitly reserves some powers for the states: “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
30
See infra PART III.
31
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
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the program fees collected by the states are properly considered taxes
for the purposes of the TIA. This inquiry will demonstrate that while
plaintiffs in a minority of states may be prohibited from bringing
Regulation enforcement actions in federal court, the majority of
plaintiffs will be able to bring these suits in both federal and state
court. The circuit cases on this issue indicate that fees designed to
generate revenue for the state beyond the costs of the disabled
parking programs are taxes, and that fees designed to merely recover
32
the costs of these programs are not.
Finally, this Comment concludes that all fifty states can be
prevented from charging disabled drivers to participate in disabled
parking programs because: (1) Title II of the ADA is a proper
exercise of Commerce Clause power; (2) the States have voluntarily
enacted disabled parking programs; (3) the Regulation is valid under
the Chevron framework; and (4) while the TIA may impact federal
court jurisdiction in a minority of cases, it will not prevent plaintiffs
from obtaining relief for violations of the Regulation.
I. GARRETT AND THE SPLIT OVER THE VALIDITY AND METHODS OF
ANALYSIS OF TITLE II AND 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(F) AS AN EXERCISE OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT POWER
33

A. Garrett v. Board of Trustees

Of the five circuits to consider the Regulation, only the last of
34
these decisions was handed down in the wake of Garrett. Garrett
holds that Title I of the ADA is an invalid exercise of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and, therefore, private
35
individuals cannot sue the states directly for Title I violations. While
this decision is expressly limited to Title I, the Court may soon extend
its Garrett holding to Title II, as it has granted certiorari on this issue
36
before.

32

Id.
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
34
See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001).
35
531 U.S. at 374.
36
The Tenth Circuit twice delayed its decision in Thompson v. Colorado to await
the outcome of two Supreme Court cases.
After oral argument, this court formally abated the case following the
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Florida Dept. of Corr. v. Dickson.
The Dickson case settled, however, and this case was then reactivated.
This court further delayed deciding this case, however, in order to
await the outcome of Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett and
to allow the parties and the United States as intervenor to file
33
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Analyzing whether Title I validly abrogates states’ Eleventh
37
Amendment immunity, the Court first identified the Fourteenth
38
Amendment right at issue. The Court found that the disabled have
the right to be free from irrational state discrimination and that the
states can discriminate against the disabled as long as the
discrimination is rationally linked to a legitimate governmental
39
interest. Therefore, the right in question is a negative right that
40
protects against irrational state discrimination.
In Garrett, the Court found that Congress could only enact
positive law to enforce this Fourteenth Amendment right if it
identified a pattern of irrational state discrimination against the
41
disabled. If Congress identified such a pattern in state employment
practices, then Title I would be a valid exercise of Congress’s
42
enforcement power. The Court determined in Garrett, however, that
Congress had not identified repeated irrational state discrimination

supplemental briefs; the Supreme Court decided Garrett on February
21, 2001.
Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1023 (citations omitted). Dickson held that the ADA, as a
whole, was a valid abrogation of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from private
suits for damages, because the ADA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426,
1429 (11th Cir. 1998).
37
The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a
State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the
Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.
The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that
nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal
court. We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally
intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional
authority. The first of these requirements is not in dispute here. See 42
U.S.C. § 12202 (“A State shall not be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in
[a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of
this chapter”). The question, then, is whether Congress acted within
its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal
court for money damages under the ADA.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (citations and quotations omitted).
38
531 U.S. at 365.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 368.
42
Id.
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against the disabled in state employment practices.
The Court
noted that the congressional record supporting Title I contains
numerous examples of discrimination against the disabled in the
44
employment context. The Court held, however, that the majority of
these examples do not count as part of a state pattern against the
disabled that support Title I as an exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power that is binding against the states
because the examples were not contemporaneous acts of
45
discrimination by the “states themselves.”
The Court further noted in dicta that even if Congress developed
a sufficient record of irrational employment discrimination, the
remedy it developed for this discrimination would still have to be
46
congruent and proportional to the pattern identified by Congress.
The Court found that the duties imposed on states by Title I went
beyond what even a clear pattern of state discrimination could
47
support.
A clear pattern of state discrimination, the Court
suggested, would resemble that identified by Congress in support of
48
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Although the Court determined that
43

The Court noted the record contained only six examples of such
discrimination. Id. at 369. Justice Breyer vigorously disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of what should count as an example of unconstitutional
discrimination. 531 U.S. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer, in contrast to
the majority’s identification of six examples of state discrimination, found the record
contained over 300 examples of state discrimination.) The majority’s reply to this
assertion clarifies its position:
Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his
Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in
employment. At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations
describe conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional
violations by the States, and most of them are so general and brief that
no firm conclusion can be drawn. The overwhelming majority of these
accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the
provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas
are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA.
Id. at 371 n.7.
44
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368, 369 n.5.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 372.
47
“The accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that
it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would
fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ upon the employer.” Id.
48
In that Act, Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional
action by the States. State officials, Congress found, routinely applied
voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens from
registering to vote. [citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
312 (1966).] Congress also determined that litigation had proved
ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50percentage-point gap in the registration of white and African-American
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disabled individuals do have specific Fourteenth Amendment rights,
it also held that the identified congressional record of state
discrimination was insufficient to support an abrogation of state
immunity, and suggested that even if the record was adequate, the
remedies developed by Congress were not congruent and
49
proportional to the pattern of violations.
The Court did not seem to think its holding would dramatically
50
impact the enforceability of the ADA. Rather, the Court noted in
dicta that Title I should still be enforceable against the states through
Ex Parte Young suits for injunctive relief and actions for money
51
damages brought by the United States.
This illustrates that the
Court assumes that Title I, even if invalid as an exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power, is a valid exercise of another
52
congressional power.
Although the Court’s ruling in Garrett is limited to Title I, its
method of analysis suggests that Title II may not be a valid exercise of
53
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Courts considering
voters in some States. [citing 383 U.S. at 313.] Congress’s response was
to promulgate in the Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial
scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the
Fifteenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant
evidence of States’ systematic denial of those rights was identified.
Id. at 373.
49
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
50
Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for
money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for
injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In
addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in
employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of
redress.
Id. at 374 n.9.
51
Id.
52
Congress invoked its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and
Commerce Clause power when it enacted the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2002).
For the ADA to be valid and enforceable, it must be a legitimate exercise of one or
both of these powers.
53
See supra note 14 for a discussion of courts choosing whether or not to extend
Garrett’s rationale and invalidate Title II of the ADA as an exercise of the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power.
Like its decision in Kimel regarding the regulation of age
discrimination under the ADEA, the Court in Garrett concluded that
the ADA presented a broad restriction on disability discrimination,
such that the ADA prohibited substantially more employment decisions
by states than would be held unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Redefining the Relationship Between the State and the Federal
Government: A Focus on the Supreme Court’s Expansion of the Principle of State Sovereign
Immunity, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 25 (2001).
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Title II after Garrett have found that Garrett requires them to consider
whether Title II as a whole is a valid exercise of Fourteenth
54
Amendment enforcement power.
Under the Garrett framework,
rights provided to individuals by any Title of the ADA against the
states may be unenforceable through private suits for damages if the
states have not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from
55
suit.
Garrett does not eliminate the possibility, however unlikely, that
the Court may uphold Title II as a valid exercise of Congress’s
56
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power. The Court, in order
to reach this result, would have to find that Title II’s congressional
record indicates that states actively excluded the disabled from
participating in society. To support this finding, the record must
demonstrate that Title II is congruent and proportional to the
identified pattern of violations that may be contained in an extensive
history of litigation against the states. While Garrett offers some
clarity, the differing approaches to analyzing the validity of the
Regulation among the circuits demonstrate that current analysis of
these concerns is still unclear.
B. The Circuit Split
57

Four circuits are split over the question of whether states may
charge disabled drivers to recover the administrative costs of their

54

The Sixth Circuit, for example, followed this approach in Popovich v. Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 812 n.4 (6th Cir. 2002).
[T]he majority of the Supreme Court in Garrett seems to have . . .
established a clear rule that disability discrimination deserves only
rational basis review and that Congress may not go beyond this
standard under the Equal Protection Clause by imposing new liabilities
on the states. This Garrett rule would appear to apply to both Title I
and Title II, although the Court has not made this holding explicit as
to Title II, and it is possible, though unlikely, that a majority of the
Supreme Court might distinguish Garrett . . . .
Id. The Second Circuit has also followed this whole title approach. See Garcia v.
State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
55
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363.
56
This issue will likely be definitively decided very soon. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on a Title II case from the Ninth Circuit and indicated that it will
decide whether Title II can be enforced directly against the states for money
damages. Hason v. Med. Bd. of California, 294 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 18, 2002) (No. 02-479).
57
See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Hedgepeth
v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2000); Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir.
2000); Brown v. North Carolina DMV, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Dare v.
California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999).
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from placing:
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The Regulation prohibits the states

a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any
group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of such
measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program
accessibility, that are required to provide that individual or group
with the non-discriminatory treatment required by the Act or this
59
part.

States charge these fees for parking placards and/or special license
plates, which are required to park in disabled-designated parking
60
areas. The divided circuits approach the issue in three different
ways.
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to hold that a private suit
seeking money damages against a state is a valid method to enforce
61
the Regulation.
The court held that because Title II is a valid
exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power
when considered as a whole, the Regulation is also valid and directly
62
enforceable against the states. The Fourth Circuit found that the
Regulation, considered alone, exceeds congressional Fourteenth
63
Amendment enforcement power. The Fifth Circuit followed the
64
Fourth Circuit in dismissing litigation against the state of Texas.
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
65
Title II should be considered as a whole. Unlike the Ninth Circuit,
however, the Tenth Circuit found Title II of the ADA invalid as an
66
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Thus, the circuits are split over whether the Regulation is a valid
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power if Title II as
a whole is a valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power, and whether the Regulation must be an independently valid
exercise of congressional power to provide a right that is directly
enforceable against the states. A review of the rationales employed by
these circuits illustrates the approaches and provides the groundwork
for a more thorough discussion of these issues.

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

See infra PART I.B.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2001).
See supra note 4.
Dare, 191 F.3d at 1167.
Id. at 1175.
Brown, 166 F.3d at 698.
Neinast, 217 F.3d at 275.
Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1020.
Id. at 1031.
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67

In 1999, the Ninth Circuit held that Title II’s prohibition on
charging the disabled to participate in ADA programs could be
enforced through private suits for damages because Title II of the
ADA was a valid exercise of congressional power that properly
68
abrogated state immunity. The Court found that even though the
DOJ—acting under congressionally delegated authority—enacted the
Regulation, it must be treated as though Congress enacted it, because
69
the Supreme Court’s holding in Olmstead v. ex rel Zimring requires
70
courts to treat federal agencies as they would Congress. Under this
rationale, Title II regulations promulgated by the DOJ are directly
enforceable against the states because Congress enacted the
71
regulations through its delegated agent, the DOJ. As long as the
DOJ’s regulations are generally consistent with the purposes of the
72
ADA, courts need not consider whether a regulation is valid. As
long as the Title that a regulation is enacted under is valid, the
73
regulation will also be valid.
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis, because it did not have the benefit
of the Supreme Court’s Garrett holding, focused on the “congruence
and proportionality” requirements articulated in City of Boerne v.
74
Flores. Under this test, Congress properly abrogates state immunity
when it enacts legislation that uses means congruent to the scope of a
75
well-identified pattern of unconstitutional activity. The legislation
must also be proportional in that it cannot do much more than is
necessary to prevent the identified unconstitutional behavior from
67

191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1175.
69
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
70
Courts must sometimes defer to the determinations of federal agencies the
same way courts would defer to Congress.
As the Supreme Court stated in Olmstead: [b]ecause the Department
[of Justice] is the agency directed by Congress to issue regulations
implementing Title II, its views warrant respect. We need not inquire
whether the degree of deference described in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., is in order; “it is enough to
observe that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a
statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”
191 F.3d at 1176 n.7 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Dare, 191 F.3d at 1174 (discussing the congruence and proportionality
requirements set forth in Boerne).
75
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
68
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76

occurring in the future.
The Ninth Circuit found that Title II satisfies Boerne’s
congruence requirement because Congress made “specific factual
findings of arbitrary and invidious discrimination against the
77
disabled” and enacted the ADA in response to those findings. The
court found that Congress’s Title II factual findings and remedies
78
should be given deference. The Ninth Circuit further noted that
the Supreme Court previously found that “unjustified isolation . . . is
79
properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.” The court
determined Title II also satisfies Boerne’s proportionality requirement
because “Congress’s findings were sufficiently extensive and related
to the ADA’s provisions that [Title II] can be understood as
80
responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior.” In
sum, Dare prohibits all states within the Ninth Circuit from charging
81
disabled drivers for participating in disabled parking programs.
82

2. Brown v. North Carolina DMV

The Fourth Circuit also utilized a Boerne “congruence and
83
proportionality” analysis to address the validity of the Regulation.
The circuit, considering the regulation alone, found the Regulation
84
an invalid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Consequently, the court found that the Regulation does not provide
private individuals with Fourteenth Amendment actions against the
85
states. The United States, as an intervenor, encouraged the court to
consider the constitutionality of Title II as a whole, rather than the
86
Regulation standing alone.
The court refused the government’s
proposed analysis, finding such a consideration would force the court
to “ratify unnecessarily the constitutionality of every provision in the
87
title.” To support its position, the court noted that courts have long
88
sought to adjudge only unavoidable questions of constitutionality.

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 532.
Dare, 191 F.3d at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1175 (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 595).
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
See supra note 4.
166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 707-08.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id.
“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
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The Fourth Circuit also determined that the broad method of
analysis would allow unconstitutional regulations to hide behind
89
constitutional statutes. The court postulated that this would allow
unconstitutional regulations to be enforced against the states, a
problem of particular importance in light of federalism and
90
sovereign immunity concerns.
The Fourth Circuit’s Boerne analysis included a discussion of the
legislative record of the ADA that concluded the type of activity
identified by Congress, while surely discriminatory, did not constitute
91
unconstitutional discrimination by the states. More importantly, the
court found that the Regulation’s prohibition on charging disabled
drivers could only be sustained if “many of those surcharges ‘have a
92
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.’” The court looked
93
to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center as the benchmark for
disabled individuals Fourteenth Amendment rights, and applied
94
rational basis scrutiny to the fees. In so doing, the court quickly
determined the fees were rationally based to recover the cost of
95
programs designed to help the disabled, and because the fees were
rational, the disabled did not have a Fourteenth Amendment right to
96
be protected from them. The court emphasized that, in its view, the
Regulation went well beyond prophylactic action and instead
attempted to do something that Cleburne prohibits: establish the

constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Brown, 166 F.3d at 704
(quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104 (1944)).
89
The court seemed particularly concerned that this approach would upset the
balance of federalism in favor of the national government.
Looking broadly at an entire title would leave underprotected these
important state interests in immunity. Ratifying an entire title and
finding abrogation without examining the actual, specific legal basis
for suit could subject a state to suit in federal court pursuant to an
unconstitutional provision buried in the midst of an otherwise
constitutional statutory scheme. Such a jurisprudence—one leading to
sweeping validations of abrogation—would be completely discordant
with the doctrine of dual sovereignty.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 707.
92
Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
93
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that classifications of individuals with mental
retardation are quasi-suspect and subject to rational review).
94
A state violates the Equal Protection rights of the disabled when its actions
towards the disabled are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
See supra PART I.A.
95
Brown, 166 F.3d at 707.
96
Id.
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disabled as a “suspect or quasi-suspect equal protection
97
classification.”
The close of the court’s opinion, emphasizing the amount of the
yearly one dollar per driver fee, illustrates the court’s satisfaction that
the fee was related to a legitimate governmental purpose and
98
therefore survived rational basis review.
Affirming the plaintiff’s
lack of standing to sue, the Fourth Circuit expressly noted that its
opinion in no way adjudged the Regulation’s constitutionality as an
99
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
3. Neinast v. Texas

100

The Fifth Circuit’s analysis is similar to that of the Fourth
Circuit. Moreover, its conclusion is the same—the Regulation is not a
101
valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Like
102
the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth considered Boerne of central import.
Unlike the Fourth, however, the Fifth Circuit combined Boerne with a
103
Chevron analysis to determine the degree of deference, if any, it had
104
to give the DOJ.
105
The court found, even under Chevron, that it was not required
to give the DOJ any deference regarding the Regulation because the
Regulation went beyond Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
106
enforcement power by attempting to create rights to protect against
107
The
constitutional, rather than unconstitutional, discrimination.
court implied that although Title II’s access requirements might be
constitutionally permissible, anything beyond requiring the states to
provide access, such as a prohibition on rational discrimination
against the disabled, was beyond Congress’s power under the
108
Fourteenth Amendment.
97

Id. at 707-08.
“To cover the cost of the placards, North Carolina introduced the most modest
of all possible fees—one dollar a year.” Id. at 708.
99
Id. at 708 n.1.
100
217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2000).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 282.
103
467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a discussion of Chevron, see infra PART IV.
104
Neinast, 217 F.3d at 281.
105
See infra PART IV for a discussion of Chevron.
106
“An agency, or as here, an executive office with delegated power to promulgate
rules, cannot have greater power to regulate state conduct than does Congress.”
Neinast, 217 F.3d at 281.
107
Id. at 282.
108
The regulation’s scope goes further than simply requiring states to
provide access to their facilities and programs; it bars the sharing of any
98
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109

4. Thompson v. Colorado

Thompson, a Tenth Circuit decision issued in 2001, illustrates the
110
The plaintiffs in Thompson, disabled
potential impact of Garrett.
drivers suing the state to prevent it from charging fees to participate
in the state’s disabled parking program, were in an identical position
111
to those in earlier cases.
Although the court’s method of analysis
resembles that of the Dare court, the Thompson court held, the
opposite of Dare, that Title II exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth
112
Amendment enforcement power to enact.
Both parties in Dare moved for summary judgment at the district
113
court level.
The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment and denied Colorado’s motion, holding that Title
114
II was a valid abrogation of state immunity.
The Tenth Circuit,
attempting to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment barred
the plaintiff’s suit, focused its review on whether Title II was, in fact, a
valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
115
power.
The Tenth Circuit’s holding is broad: none of Title II validly
abrogates states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress
did not identify a historical pattern of unconstitutional state

costs of such measures, a highly intrusive limit on the core state power
to choose revenue sources. There is no plausible claim that banning
any fees by the state corrects past discrimination against individuals
with disabilities regarding access or that it seeks prophylactically to
prevent the state from intentionally discouraging them from enjoying
access.
A requirement as to who bears minimal costs of
accommodation relates back not to the relevant constitutional harm,
but only to other prophylactic steps. We thus distinguish this situation
from Congress’ss ban through the Voting Rights Act on literacy tests,
whose use had been shown to be an effort to discriminate. (citing
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-26.; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1996)). This degree of separation leaves the regulation unanchored
to a constitutional purpose. It is an impermissible form of regulatory
creep. The regulation bears such an attenuated relationship to the
remedial goal that it cannot be understood as a remedial or
prophylactic response to unconstitutional behavior. We hold that 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(f) exceeds the scope of Congress’s power to abrogate
the states’ immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
109
278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1022.
112
Id. at 1034.
113
Id. at 1022.
114
Id.
115
Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1028-29.
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discrimination against the disabled involving state “services,
116
programs, and activities” when it enacted the ADA.
The court’s
rationale rested on its interpretation of the Garrett decision,
beginning with the premise that each title of the ADA should be
considered independently to determine if it is a valid exercise of
117
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
The
Tenth Circuit found that, because of the doctrinal refinement in
Garrett, it faced an issue of first impression as to the validity of Title
118
II.
The court’s second step followed Garrett by attempting to
“identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at
119
issue.” The court found that the accommodation requirements of
Title II went beyond the general requirements of the Equal
120
Protection Clause.
Instead, the court noted that the states are
subject to three general Fourteenth Amendment principles
121
governing the rights of the disabled.
First, facial distinctions
between the non-disabled and the disabled must be rationally related
122
to a legitimate state interest. Second, invidious state action against
123
the disabled is always unconstitutional.
Finally, in “certain limited
circumstances such as those involving voting rights and prison
conditions, states are required to make at least some
124
accommodations for the disabled.”
Using these principles, the
court determined that Congress improperly invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacted Title II of the ADA because the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be used to create affirmative
obligations on the states that are intended to benefit disabled
125
individuals.

116

Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1027.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1030 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365).
120
The court goes further than this, suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause
may not support any of the ADA.
While the basic premise of the Equal Protection Clause is that similarly
situated citizens should be treated alike, the mandate of the ADA is
that those who are not similarly situated should be treated differently.
The Equal Protection Clause does not generally require
accommodations on behalf of the disabled by the states.
Id. at 1031.
121
Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1032.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1031.
117
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The Tenth Circuit provided an additional rationale for finding
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide Congress with the
126
power to enact the ADA.
Here the court again turned to Garrett,
considering whether or not Congress sufficiently established a
127
legislative record of state violation of the rights of the disabled.
While the court noted that the vast majority of the legislative record
supporting Title II involved the public entities refusing to ensure that
disabled individuals had access to “programs, services and activities,”
it found that these examples predominantly involved “local officials
128
and not the states.” The court suggested that the preponderance of
positive state legislation for the disabled effectively prevents Congress
from establishing a sufficient record to justify Title II by largely
129
eliminating state discrimination against the disabled.
C. Future Analysis of Title II: What Courts Should do When
Considering Title II as an Exercise of Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power
All fifty states have passed legislation protecting disabled
130
citizens. A number of these state laws do not protect the disabled as
131
comprehensively as the ADA. Indeed, the circuit split over disabled
parking placard fees offers a clear example of state legislation that
does not reach as far as the ADA in protecting the rights of the
132
disabled.
Yet, state laws may provide minimal protection that is
126

Id. at 1034.
Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1034.
128
Id. at 1033.
129
Id. at 1033 n.8.
130
In Garrett, the majority noted that state action may have effectively limited the
need for federal intervention.
It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in
1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least
one Member of Congress remarked that “this is probably one of the
few times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal
Government, it’s not funny.” Hearing on Discrimination Against
Cancer Victims and the Handicapped before the Subcommittee on
Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1987). A number of these
provisions, however, did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring
accommodation.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5. With respect to employment laws, the Court is certainly
correct. All fifty states have passed disabled employment legislation. See Stevens v.
Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 740 n.6 (7th Cir. 2000).
131
If all states enacted schemes as comprehensive as the ADA, the thirty-one states
that charge for disabled parking placards would be barred from enacting the fee
schemes discussed in this Comment by their own laws.
132
See supra PART I.B.
127
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sufficient to keep Congress from ever developing the kind of record
that would be adequate to support the affirmative obligations of the
Regulation and Title II. While this is discouraging for ADA plaintiffs
seeking money damages, the Supreme Court has not determined that
the record of Title II is deficient, it has only indicated that the record
of Title I was insufficient for a valid exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power and that the record of the Voting
133
Rights Act was sufficient.
Courts considering Title II’s validity will
therefore have to consider whether the congressional record
supporting Title II is adequate to meet the concerns the Court
134
outlined in Garrett.
This will require courts to consider whether
Title II’s record is like Title I’s, and therefore deficient, or enough
like the Voting Rights Act’s to be a valid exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment power.
II. TITLE II IS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S COMMERCE CLAUSE
POWER
Plaintiffs may lose their ability to sue the states directly for
money damages for violating the Regulation if the Court finds Title II
is an invalid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Nonetheless, if Title II is a valid exercise of constitutional authority—
other than that stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment—then
plaintiffs should still be able to obtain injunctive relief and attorney’s
135
136
fees by suing state officials under Ex Parte Young. To support the
ADA Congress invoked not only its Fourteenth Amendment
137
enforcement power, but also its Commerce Clause power.
No court has yet determined whether the Commerce Clause
provides an adequate source of power to support the Regulation.
The attractiveness of the ADA’s direct suit provision and its
133

See supra note 48.
See supra PART I.B.
135
Like other civil rights statutes, the ADA provides that successful ADA plaintiffs
are entitled to attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2002).
136
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’
sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages
under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no
federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still
prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be
enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as
by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte
Young.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
137
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2002).
134
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corresponding damages remedy is likely a factor that deters plaintiffs
138
from suing under Ex Parte Young.
Decisions invalidating the
Regulation as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
139
It is likely that
power seem to have surprised many plaintiffs.
plaintiffs litigating the parking issue would have included Ex Parte
140
Young claims had they foreseen these holdings.
Some courts have
resisted determining the ADA’s constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause because they found the ADA, as a whole, was a
141
valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Given the number of circuits finding the Regulation and/or Title II
unconstitutional as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power, it is probable that future Title II litigation
brought against state officials will focus on the Title’s validity under
the Commerce Clause. Thus, a review of the Commerce Clause is in
order.
A. What Congress can Regulate under the Commerce Power: United
142
143
States v. Lopez & United States v. Morrison
For most of the twentieth century, the Commerce Clause served
as a congressional catchall, affording Congress nearly limitless power
144
to enact new laws. This interpretation of the Commerce Clause was

138

If [a] federal statute proves to be beyond Congress’s power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment—a prospect Flores makes more than
speculative—then the remedies available in the federal forum shrink
before the Eleventh Amendment bar.
Monetary damages are
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment and prospective injunctive
relief against state officials, as permitted by Ex parte Young, is all that
remains.
Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 803 (1998).
139
The plaintiffs in Thompson attempted to add an Ex Parte Young claim at the
circuit level, anticipating the Court’s decision after Garrett. The circuit court,
however, denied the plaintiff’s request. Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1025 n.2.
140
Id.
141
See Brown, 166 F.3d at 708 n.1. “We need not decide whether Congress
properly invoked its Commerce Clause power in enacting the ADA, for we have
already held that the ADA is a valid exercise of congressional power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 83536 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Amos v. Maryland Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178
F.3d 212, 223 (4th Cir. 1999).
142
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
143
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
144
Lopez is recognized as a severe step in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine.
“In United States v. Lopez, the Court held for the first time in recent years that the
commerce power is not absolutely plenary and that some things are beyond
Congress’s reach under the commerce power.” Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case,
Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 3, 12 (1997).
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dramatically altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez. To
determine if the Regulation and/or Title II may survive as a valid
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Power, three pivotal cases—Lopez,
Morrison, and Condon—must be analyzed in turn.
1. Lopez: the Commerce Framework Redefined
In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun Free School
146
Zone Act
(“GFSZA”) was not a valid exercise of Congress’s
147
Commerce Power.
The Court, reviewing Commerce Clause
doctrine, found that the doctrine allows Congress to regulate:
channels of commerce; persons, things, and instrumentalities in
interstate commerce; and intrastate activities that substantially affect
148
Lopez embodies the Court’s restatement of
interstate commerce.
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, after a long
period during which the Clause was treated as a plenary power
149
subject only to internal constitutional limitations.
The Court found that the possession of a gun in a school zone
was neither a commercial activity nor one that was “connected in any
150
The Court linked each of the three
way to interstate commerce.”
acceptable categories of commerce regulation to precedent to
151
support its interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Power.
The
Court then developed the proposition that Congress had the power
152
to regulate channels of interstate commerce from United States v.
153
154
Darby and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States. The Court further
noted that Congress might regulate “instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
155
the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”
To support

145

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (2002). The act made it a crime “for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.” 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (2002).
147
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
148
Id. at 558-59.
149
See supra note 144.
150
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
151
Id. at 558-59.
152
While the channel of commerce argument might conceivably be made by
future litigants, it does not pertain to the type of activity regulated by 28 C.F.R.
section 35.130(f), and consequently does not merit much discussion here.
153
312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Act of 1938 as an exercise of
the Commerce Power).
154
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a
valid exercise of the Commerce Power).
155
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
146
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this proposition, the Court cited the Shreveport Rate Cases, Southern
157
158
Thus,
Railroad Co. v. United States, and Perez v. United States.
Congress may regulate interstate rail lines and the fees that they
159
charge, invoke safety regulations that create standards applicable to
160
intrastate traffic in order to maintain interstate safety, and regulate
activities like loan sharking that have a substantial affect on interstate
161
crime and, therefore, interstate commerce as a whole.
The final category the Court identified includes “those activities
162
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”
This type of activity
163
is identified in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel and in Maryland v.
164
Wirtz.
This category permits Congress to regulate national labor
165
practices, as well as the minimum wage and maximum hours of
166
employees engaged in commerce related activities.
Notably, the
Wirtz Court found that:
while the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of
commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a
State is involved. If a State is engaging in economic activities that
are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in
by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
167
activities to federal regulation.
168

In Lopez, the Court also quoted from Wickard v. Filburn, a case
holding Congress has the power to regulate the production of homegrown wheat:
[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect
156

234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (holding that the Commerce Power allows Congress
to regulate the “intrastate transactions of interstate carriers”).
157
222 U.S. 20 (1911) (noting that Congress has the power to regulate the
interstate shipment of goods).
158
402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding Congress’s regulation of loansharking, an
intrastate activity, because of loansharking’s interstate effects).
159
Shreveport, 234 U.S. at 360.
160
Southern, 220 U.S. at 26.
161
Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
162
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
163
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act as a proper
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
164
392 U.S. 183 (1968) (finding the Commerce Power supported Congress’s
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
165
Jones, 301 U.S. at 37.
166
Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27.
167
Id. at 196.
168
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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is what might at some earlier time have been defined as “direct”
169
or “indirect.”

The Court applied the three-tiered framework to the GFSZA and
170
determined that the Act fit into neither of the first two categories.
The Court then began its analysis of whether the GFZSA fit into the
third category by restating that “where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
171
The Court, considering whether the Act regulated
sustained.”
activity that had a substantial affect on interstate commerce,
172
determined that it did not.
The Court noted the Act did not
regulate activity that was substantially related to interstate commerce,
and did not contain a jurisdictional analysis to determine whether the
gun possession in question in a particular case actually affected
173
interstate commerce.
Although Congress was not required to
present congressional findings of an activity’s substantial effects on
interstate commerce in the record of any act invoked under the
Commerce Clause, the Court remarked that such “findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no
174
such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye.”
B. Morrison: Further Constriction of the Commerce Power
In Morrison, the Court invalidated another act enacted under
175
Congress’s Commerce Power, the Violence Against Women Act
176
(“VAWA”). VAWA is similar to the ADA, in that Congress utilized
both its Commerce Power and its Enforcement Power under the
177
The Court’s analysis of the Commerce
Fourteenth Amendment.
178
Clause support for VAWA followed in the footsteps of Lopez.
The Court concluded that violent, gender-based crime was a
non-economic activity and that Congress could not regulate it under

169

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
Id. at 559.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 561.
174
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
175
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002).
176
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
177
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002).
178
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. “Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law
demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of
intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce,
the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” Id. at 611.
170
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the Commerce Power, despite the economic effects of the crime.
Even though VAWA was supported by specific legislative findings as
to the economic effects of the activity it regulated, like the GFSZA,
the Court found that VAWA contained “no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of
180
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.”
The Court
determined it could independently analyze evidence presented in the
congressional record to determine whether the evidence supported
181
the proposition that the activity substantially affected commerce
182
and rejected the evidence presented by Congress to support VAWA.
Thus, while VAWA was supported by congressional findings that
gender-motivated violence had a substantial interstate impact, the
Court found these examples were precisely the kind of congressional
183
justification that the Court rejected in Lopez.
The Court held that
this rationale, which would allow Congress to regulate any crime with
a substantial but attenuated nationwide effect on commerce, went
well beyond the scope of permissible regulation under Congress’s
184
Commerce Power.
C. Applying the Commerce Clause Framework to Title II
At this point, it is worth inquiring how Title II is different from
the legislation struck down by the Court in Lopez and Morrison. This
inquiry addresses whether Title II properly regulates activity that falls
185
within any of the Lopez categories.
While Title II does not seem to fit within either the first or
179

Id. at 613.
Id. at 613-14.
181
Id. at 614.
182
Id. at 616-17.
183
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-17.
184
“We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate
effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local.” Id. at 617-18.
185
Notably, two circuits adopted the principle that the Regulation must be valid if
Title II is valid, see Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2000); Brown v. North
Carolina DMV, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), while another two circuits have held
that the Regulation may be invalid even if Title II is valid, see Thompson v. Colorado,
278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999).
This analysis may not be relevant for Commerce Clause analysis. The
Regulation, standing alone, may regulate commerce in an acceptable way even if
Title II as a whole does not. Indeed, if courts find that the Regulation is a valid
exercise of Commerce Clause power they do not have to consider Title II as a whole,
because to regulate under the Commerce Clause, Congress need not identify how
the “thing” it is regulating affects interstate commerce.
180
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second Lopez category, it does fit within the third. Title II’s regulation
of programs, activities, and services does not clearly regulate the
channels of interstate commerce. Also, it does not seem to regulate
typically economic activity, rather, it regulates an activity with a
substantial impact interstate commerce. Therefore, Title II must be
considered under the third prong of the Lopez framework. The
rationale tying Title II to the Commerce Clause is that the disabled
are capable of being economically productive members of American
society, but have historically been prevented from engaging in
186
productive commercial activity by widespread discrimination.
In
Bowers v. NAACP, considering whether Title II regulated commercial
activity, noted that Congress clearly thought it did:
Congress plainly considered the ADA generally, and Title II in
particular, to be a very significant piece of commercial legislation .
. . The legislative history evinces a continuing focus on the
economic impact of the public accommodations aspects of the bill.
Congress noted, for instance, that lack of accommodations creates
unemployment and underemployment . . . reduces consumer
spending . . . and undermines public health efforts to contain the
spread of disease . . . all of which contribute to lower tax revenues
and higher government spending, amounting to billions of dollars
187
annually.

The activity regulated by Title II is not activity like that regulated
in the GFSZA or VAWA, but is regulation of state activity that has a
substantial affect on interstate commerce. Congress has the authority
to decide that forcing the disabled to bear the costs of programs
designed to benefit the disabled counteracts the positive effects of
such state programs. Congress, through the DOJ, decided that the
access barriers presented by fees for special placards and license
plates are detrimental to commerce and has instructed the states, as
actors in interstate commerce, that they may not charge the disabled
188
such fees.
Therefore, a court considering this issue should find,
189
considering the four Lopez factors, that Title II is a valid exercise of
186

42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2002).
Bowers, 171 F. Supp. 2d 406-07.
188
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2003).
189
Because Title II falls within the third category and attempts to regulate
intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, a court considering
whether it is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power must consider the following
Lopez factors: (1) does the regulated activity substantially affect interstate commerce;
(2) does the statute contain a jurisdictional element that suggests the statute is
actually attempting to regulate interstate, rather than intrastate commerce; (3) does
the Congressional record support the proposition that the regulated activity has a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce; and (4) would upholding the
187
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Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
III. VOLUNTARILY ENACTED STATE DISABLED PARKING PROGRAMS MAY
BE REGULATED BY CONGRESS
Although Congress can regulate activity properly considered
commerce, the ways Congress can regulate the states as commercial
actors are limited by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, even if a court
finds Title II properly regulates commerce, it will still have to
consider whether the method of regulation impermissibly violates the
Tenth Amendment. Two cases are widely recognized as clearly
establishing Tenth Amendment limitations on Congress’s ability to
190
regulate commerce: New York v. United States and Printz v. United
191
States. In these two cases, the Court established the proposition that
the federal government may not force “the states to enact or enforce
192
a federal regulatory program” under the Commerce Clause. In the
aftermath of New York and Printz, the states can be required to enact
new legislation or alter existing legislation in order to conform to
federal law, so long as the law regulates state activities and does not
seek “to control or influence the manner in which States regulate
193
private parties.”
194
In Reno v. Condon, the Court applied these principles to the
195
Driver Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (“DPPA”).
The DPPA
prohibits states from selling the information they require drivers to
196
Because the Court
provide in order to obtain a driver’s license.
found that the regulated databases were “things” in interstate
commerce, it held that the databases could be regulated under the
197
Commerce Clause.
Relying heavily on the principles it articulated
198
in South Carolina v. Baker, the Court held that the DPPA did not
regulation require the Court to “pile inference upon inference?” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
567. None of these factors is determinative. Id.
190
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress can use the Commerce Clause
power to encourage states to act, but not to force the states to act).
191
521 U.S. 898, 934 (1997) (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . Congress cannot circumvent that
prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”).
192
Condon, 528 U.S. at 149.
193
Id. at 150 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
194
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
195
18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2002).
196
The states can still distribute the information if they obtain the driver’s
consent. Condon, 528 U.S. at 144.
197
Id. at 148.
198
485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (“That a State wishing to engage in certain activity
must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal
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require the states to enact new legislation nor assist with federal
199
enforcement.
In so holding, the Court reasoned the DPPA was
similar to the statute in Baker, because it did not require the states to
regulate their own citizens, rather it regulated the way in which the
200
states conducted their own activities. Although the DPPA prohibits
the sale of the information that states collect from drivers, requires
the legislature to alter existing statutes, and requires state officials to
201
learn the mandate of the DPPA in order to comply with it, the
Court stated that none of these factors were sufficient to support the
proposition that the DPPA unconstitutionally “commandeered” the
202
states.
While this analysis suggests that states could escape the
requirements of the Regulation by revoking their disabled parking
programs, the states are unlikely to take such action. Disabled
parking programs are established programs in every state. Because
the Regulation is likely to be upheld as valid under Congress’s
Commerce Power, it should provide disabled plaintiffs with an
enforceable right to participate in disabled parking programs without
paying a fee beyond ordinary licensing costs.
Although the
Commerce Power could not be used to force states to enact and pay
for disabled parking programs because this would violate the anticommandeering principles outlined above, once states enact such
203
programs Congress can regulate them.
IV. THE REGULATION IS A PERMISSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF TITLE II
OF THE ADA
Even if a court walks through the steps discussed above and finds
that Title II is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power that does

standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional
defect.”).
199
Condon, 528 U.S. at 150.
200
Regulation of the states is more likely to be upheld when it does not pertain to
uniquely state activity.
The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of databases. It does not
require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations,
and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal statutes regulating private individuals.
We accordingly
conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles
enunciated in New York and Printz.
Id. at 151.
201
18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2002).
202
Condon, 528 U.S. at 151.
203
Many states passed such programs, even prior to the passage of the ADA. See
supra note 5.
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not commandeer the states it will not uphold the Regulation unless it
finds that the Regulation is based on a permissible interpretation of
204
Title II.
The Regulation was not enacted by Congress, but by the
DOJ, and is therefore subject to this further review. This review,
205
however, is limited to two factors. A court considering a regulation
must first ask if Congress specifically approved or disapproved of a
206
regulation. If Congress’s intent is clear it is determinative.
If
Congress’s intent is not clear but Congress delegated rulemaking
authority to a federal agency, then the agency’s regulation must be
upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
207
statute.”
The Supreme Court has indicated that this deference to agency
rulemaking is necessary because “the resolution of ambiguity in a
208
statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law.”
209
Although court review of agency policymaking is limited courts are
210
able to invalidate actions clearly outside of the scope of the statute.
This might seem to severely hamper court review of agency action,
however, courts still have the power, as the above discussion of
Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause power indicate, to
invalidate the statute upon which the delegation of authority is based
and thereby negate the agency’s rulemaking ability under the statute.
Thus, this type of deference to agency rulemaking, commonly known
as “Chevron deference” will have no impact if the statute that
empowers an agency to create the regulation in question is
211
invalidated by the courts.
Although Congress clearly delegated authority to the DOJ to
212
enact regulations designed to implement Title II, it does not seem
that Congress clearly contemplated a definitive approach to the

204

Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 843. “Chevron establishes that a reviewing court must often accept any
reasonable agency construction, even if the court does not regard that construction
as the best one.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 398 (4th ed. 1996).
208
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
209
Id.
210
467 U.S. at 843.
211
See John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the
Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995), for a more thorough discussion of
Chevron and Chevron deference.
212
42 U.S.C. § 12134 (a) (2003) (“Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act [enacted July 26, 1990], the Attorney General shall promulgate
regulations in an accessible format that implement this subtitle.”).
205
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regulation of disabled parking programs when it enacted Title II.
This will require any court considering the Regulation to take the
second Chevron step. This step is not fatal because the regulation of
disabled parking programs clearly falls within Title II’s general
coverage of state services, activities, and programs. Therefore, courts
must uphold the regulation if they find that Title II is a valid exercise
of congressional power.
V. THE REGULATION IS VALID UNDER THE COMMERCE POWER AND
CAN BE INDIRECTLY ENFORCED AGAINST THE STATES, BUT NOT
NECESSARILY IN FEDERAL COURTS
While the Regulation is likely to be upheld under the Commerce
Clause, it may not be enforceable in suits brought in federal courts
213
because of the TIA.
In its entirety, the TIA provides that “[t]he
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment,
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
214
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”
As the
Tenth Circuit has noted, the TIA “does not operate to confer
jurisdiction but instead limits jurisdiction where jurisdiction might
215
otherwise exist.”
Whenever the collection of a state tax can be
challenged in a state forum, plaintiffs challenging the tax will be
barred from federal court by the TIA. Therefore, if the fees collected
by the states for disabled parking programs are properly considered a
216
tax, as at least one circuit finds, then plaintiffs may be barred from
217
commencing actions in federal court unless they have no adequate
remedy at the state level. Remedies requiring plaintiffs to pay the tax
and then seek a refund are adequate to bar a plaintiff from federal
218
court. A plaintiff’s ability to bring a federal claim in state court will
also be sufficient, but where the state is pre-empted from providing
relief or hearing a federal claim by federal law the Act will not bar a
219
plaintiff from federal court.
213
214
215
216

28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002).
Id.
May v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 508 F.2d 136, 137 (1974).
See discussion of Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2000), infra PART

V.A.
217

The Act has been construed as a jurisdictional bar to much more than claims
for injunctive relief. In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100
(1981), the Court found that damage actions against the states for illegal taxation
were also barred where plaintiffs could obtain a remedy at the state level. A year
later in California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982), the Court held the
Act also presented a jurisdictional bar to actions for declaratory relief.
218
See Kohn v. Central Distrib. Co., Inc., 306 U.S. 531 (1939).
219
See E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue, 929 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the
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The few circuits that have considered the issue of whether the
fees charged by the states are properly considered a tax under the
220
TIA are split on the issue.
The courts’ analyses turn on intent:
whether the state is only attempting to recoup the cost of the disabled
program or is attempting to use the charge to produce money for the
221
state in excess of program costs. In the latter case the fee is a tax, in
the former it is not. These circuit decisions indicate that plaintiffs’
access to the Ex Parte Young remedy and actions in federal courts may
be reduced or eliminated in states that charge fees in excess of the
cost of the parking programs.
A. The Circuit Split on Whether Disabled Parking Program Fees are a
Tax for the Purposes of the TIA.
222

223

224

The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits considered the issue
of fees ranging from $4.00 to $5.25 per placard, and determined the
225
fees are regulatory in nature rather than revenue generating.
Consequently, the courts held the TIA does not bar plaintiffs seeking
226
relief from these fees from federal court. The key factor for each of
these courts was that the fee charged by the state bore some
relationship to the cost of the program and was not designed to raise
revenue. The reasoning in Hexom v. Oregon DOT, a Ninth Circuit
case, is representative of all three opinions:
The fee is not designed to raise revenue, and enjoining its
collection will not threaten the flow of central revenues of
Oregon’s government. It is not at all critical to general state
functions. It is, instead, designed to pay for the costs of a special
program. In fine, it is not a tax, and this action is not precluded
227
by the TIA.

existence of a state remedy to plaintiff’s claim was preempted by ERISA, and that the
plaintiff’s claim therefore qualified as an exception to the Tax Injunction Act).
220
See supra PART III.A.
221
Id.
222
Neinast, 217 F.3d at 277.
223
Hexom v. Oregon DOT, 177 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999).
224
Marcus v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 1139 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “As the Texas statute
applies the charges toward the cost of the program, the district court erred in
holding that the placard funds were a tax and thus within the scope of the Tax
Injunction Act.” Neinast, 217 F.3d at 277 (finding that even though the fees were not
earmarked to cover the costs of the parking programs, their size indicates that this is
what they were intended for); see also Marcus, 170 F.3d at 1311.
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228

In Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit considered a much
larger fee than that considered by the Fifth, Ninth, or Tenth Circuit.
The court determined that the fees levied on disabled drivers were
not merely intended to defray the administrative costs of Tennessee’s
regulatory program, but were instead intended as a general revenue229
raising tax.
The court, finding that none of the $20.50 that
disabled drivers must pay to obtain a disabled driving permit (or any
of the $3 charged to renew) went directly to the cost of the state’s
regulatory program, determined that the charges were, in fact, taxes
230
controlled by the TIA.
Under the TIA, plaintiffs do not have
standing to sue unless the state fails to provide a “plain, speedy and
231
efficient remedy.”
Because Tennessee law does not preclude the
plaintiffs from bringing their claim before Tennessee’s Claims
Commission, the court found the initial requirement of the TIA was
satisfied because the Claims Commission proceeding equated to a
232
“plain, speedy and efficient remedy.”
This language, according to
the court, meant the TIA required the plaintiffs first pursue their
federally created right with the Claims Commission, then with the
233
state courts, and if these failed, in federal court.
B. Whether or Not the Fees Collected by the States Constitute a Tax,
Plaintiffs Should be able to Prevent the States from Charging Such
Fees
It is clear that when states charge fees proportional to the cost of
their disabled parking program activities, plaintiffs will be able to use
Ex Parte Young to enforce the Regulation in federal court because
234
these types of fees are not taxes for the purposes of the TIA. While
states that charge fees much higher than the cost of their disabled
parking program may be able to force plaintiffs into state remedial
schemes, state decisions to single out the disabled as a source of
revenue should actually provide disabled plaintiffs with damage
actions in state court. This remedy is available because state targeting
of the disabled as a source of revenue constitutes the kind of
irrational discrimination against the disabled discussed in Part I.

228
229
230
231
232
233
234

215 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id.
See supra PART V.A.
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235

Thus, while the Hedgepeth logic might still prevent a plaintiff from
bringing suit in federal court, plaintiffs forced out of federal court
may be able to obtain an additional remedy in state court. If Title II
is a valid exercise of congressional power the states must, under the
Supremacy Clause, enforce it in their own courts when the tax is
236
challenged.
Whether the states charge the disabled fees, or tax
237
them as Tennessee and Massachusetts do, the disabled should
ultimately be able to enjoin the states from charging them to
participate in disabled parking programs. Class action suits in state
court should also provide an effective remedy for taxes already
collected.
CONCLUSION
The above discussion demonstrates that all fifty states can
ultimately be prohibited from charging the disabled fees to
participate in disabled parking programs.
Although disabled
individuals, pending the Courts ruling on whether Title II is a valid
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, may not
have direct enforcement actions for violations of the regulation, they
should still be able to sue state officials for injunctive relief under Ex
Parte Young. This is because (1) Title II is a valid exercise of
Commerce power; (2) Title II does not violate the Tenth
Amendment; (3) the Regulation is a valid interpretation of Title II
under the Chevron framework; and (4) while the TIA may bar some
plaintiffs from seeking relief in federal court, if their state uses its
disabled parking program to generate revenue, such plaintiffs will
still be able to obtain relief in a state forum. If the fees certain states
charge are taxes—designed to generate revenue—the disabled in
those states may be able to sue for violations of their Equal Protection
Clause rights even without the protection afforded under the ADA.
To be successful on this claim the disabled would have to show taxing
those who participate in disabled parking programs amounts to
irrational state discrimination against the disabled.
While the states can be forced to comply with the Regulation as
it regulates disabled parking programs, the states should put their
235

“The substantial difference between the actual cost of the permanent placard
or license plate and the amount that must be paid to obtain one supports a
conclusion that the assessment is for general revenue raising purposes.” Hedgepeth,
215 F.3d at 614.
236
State courts not only have the power to hear Title II actions, but are obligated
to do so. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
237
Massachusetts charges its disabled drivers more than any other state: $25 for
placards. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2 (2001).
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money where their policy is and stop charging such fees—even if not
required to do so by a court order. Disabled parking programs are in
effect in all fifty states. No state has challenged the requirement that
they have disabled programs. It follows that the states believe they
should have such programs even if the ADA did not exist. The states
that force the disabled to pay in order to participate in disabled
parking programs undermine their own policies of affirmatively
acting to include the disabled in society. This “pay to play” mentality
marginalizes the disabled because it suggests that accommodating the
disabled is not really an important goal and is only supportable when
convenient to the rest of society—when they do not impact the state
budget. If disabled parking programs are important enough to
enact, states should not tokenize the programs by forcing the
disabled to fund the programs and certainly should not, as is current
practice in several states, use the programs as general sources of
revenue for the state.

